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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jesse Eugene Mann appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 
marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and driving without privileges.  On appeal he 
argues that the district court erred by (1) denying his suppression motion and (2) 
allegedly improperly instructing the jury. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On February 8, 2015, after observing Mann commit traffic infractions by failing to 
properly signal when changing lanes, Trooper Clark pulled Mann over.  (Tr., p.110, L.20 
– p.111, L.17.)  Trooper Clark contacted Mann, and Mann gave him an identification 
card out of Oregon.  (Tr., p.111, L.18 – p.112, L.3.)  Trooper Clark asked for Mann’s 
driver’s license and Mann admitted that he did not have one, due to his license being 
suspended.  (Tr., p.112, Ls.7-15.)  Mann also failed to produce registration or proof of 
insurance for the vehicle, claiming that it had been rented by his girlfriend.  (Tr., p.113, 
L.20 – p.114, L.4.)  Trooper Clark ran Mann’s information through dispatch, and then 
placed him under arrest for driving on the suspended license.  (Tr., p.115, Ls.1-10.) 
After placing Mann in the back of his patrol vehicle, according to department 
policy, Trooper Clark conducted a pre-tow inventory of the rental car.  (Tr., p.116, L.9 – 
p.117, L.6.)  During the inventory, in the front passenger compartment, the officer found 
paraphernalia—a bong with burnt residue in one end which the officer believed to be 
marijuana.  (Tr., p.118, Ls.4-21.)  In the trunk compartment, the officer also found inside 
a duffle bag eight heat-sealed packages of a green leafy substance believed to be 
marijuana.  (Tr., p.122, Ls.5-13.)  Later forensic analysis confirmed that the substance 
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was marijuana, with a total weight of 2,441.01 grams or 5.38 pounds.  (Tr., p.197, L.22 
– p.199, L.20.)  After completing the inventory, Trooper Clark transported Mann to jail 
and the rental car was towed.  (Tr., p.116, Ls.2-8.) 
The state charged Mann with trafficking in marijuana, for having more than five 
pounds of marijuana in his possession; with driving without privileges; and with 
possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.34-35.)  Mann filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence against him, arguing that it was the product of an unlawful search and seizure.  
(R., pp.46-55.)  After holding a hearing on the motion (R., pp.99-102; see also Tr., pp.7-
64), the district court denied the suppression motion (R., p.103; see also Tr., p.29, L.6 – 
p.32, L.10; p.37, L.17 – p.38, L.17; p.63, Ls.2-23). 
Mann went to trial.  (R., pp.143-67; see also Tr., pp.71-269.)  At the close of the 
trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on each count.  (R., p.203.)  The district court 
entered judgments of conviction on each count and sentenced Mann to a unified term of 
seven years with three years fixed.  (R., pp.210-13.)  Mann filed a timely notice of 




Mann states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mann’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
II. Did the district court err when it failed to instruct the jury that the 
State had to prove Mr. Mann possessed the paraphernalia with the intent 
to use in Idaho? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Mann failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his suppression 
motion? 
 










Below Mann filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the 
search of the rental car he was driving.  (R., pp.46-55.)  Determining that Mann lacked 
standing to challenge the search of the rental car, because he was an unauthorized 
driver and was not able to carry his burden of showing that the general rule did not 
apply to him under the totality of circumstances, the district court denied Mann’s motion.  
(Tr., p.29, L.6 – p.32, L.10; see also R., p.103.)  On appeal Mann challenges the district 
court’s standing determination.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-16.)  Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts found by the district court, however, shows no error by the 
court.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
 
C. Mann Lacked Standing To Challenge The Search Of The Rental Car 
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
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177 (1984).  As a threshold matter, “[a] person challenging a search has the burden of 
showing he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be 
searched.”  State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008).  To meet 
this burden, the moving party must demonstrate both “a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search” and that “society [is] willing to recognize 
that expectation as reasonable.”  Id. 
The Court of Appeals, applying case law from the federal circuits, has recognized 
that, generally, “unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles do not enjoy a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in such vehicles.”  State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272, 276, 159 P.3d 
909, 913 (Ct. App. 2007).  Adopting the precedent of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. 
Smith, 263 F.3d 571 (2001), the Court also recognized, however, that this presumption 
may be overcome in extraordinary cases under a totality of circumstances, such as  
(1) whether the defendant had a driver’s license; (2) the relationship 
between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the driver’s ability to 
present rental documents; (4) whether the driver had the lessee’s 
permission to use the car; and (5) the driver’s relationship with the rental 
company. 
 
Id. at 275, 159 P.3d at 912.   
Applying the legal standard articulated by the Court of Appeals, the district court 
correctly determined that Mann lacked standing to challenge a search of the rental car.  
(Tr., p.29, L.6 – p.32, L.10.)  Reviewing the facts of this case, it was uncontested that 
Mann lacked a valid license.  (Tr., p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.3; p.30, Ls.5-7.)  He could not 
have rented the car on his own and he had no relationship with the rental car company.  
(Tr., p.15, L.17 – p.18, L.22; p.30, Ls.18-20.)  Mann failed to show that he had the rental 
car documents.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.10-15.)  And while Mann did have a relationship with the 
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lessee, that relationship was something less than the marital relationship in Smith. 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.8-10; p.29, L.18 – p.30, L.10.)  In the absence of contrary evidence, the 
court found that Mann had permission from the lessee; but this was the only 
circumstance that weighed in Mann’s favor.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-18.)  The district court 
concluded that that single circumstance, under the totality of the circumstances, was not 
sufficient to overcome the general presumption.  (Tr., p.29, L.6 – p.30, L.22.) 
On appeal Mann claims that the district court erred by considering all of the 
factors articulated by the Court of Appeals instead of just focusing on the two factors 
that are present in any degree in this case.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15.)  But, contrary 
to Mann’s argument, the presence of permission and a relationship with the lessee are 
not sufficient to carry his burden.  Mann had no valid license and so could not legally 
operate the rental car; he could not produce the paperwork for the rental car; and he 
certainly did not have the permission of the owner of the vehicle—the rental car 
company—to drive the car.  Under the totality of the circumstances, as found by the 
district court, Mann cannot overcome the general rule that an unauthorized driver lacks 
standing to challenge the search of a rental car. 
In the alternative, Mann invites this Court to revisit the Court of Appeals’ Cutler 
decision and adopt a watered-down version of the standard applied in the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, under which a grant of permission from the lessee would be dispositive of 
the standing issue and, absent such permission, standing might still be found under a 
totality of other circumstances.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-13.)  This Court should decline 
Mann’s invitation; Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents.  The rule 
of stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly 
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wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”  
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).1 
That Mann cannot show that the Court of Appeals’ Cutler decision was wrong, 
unjust, or unwise becomes clear when reviewing further developments in the law.  Since 
the Sixth Circuit’s Smith decision, which formed the basis of the Court of Appeal’s Cutler 
decision, other federal circuits have had the opportunity to weigh in on the issue of 
whether and under what circumstances unauthorized drivers may have standing in 
rental cars.  It appears none has adopted the approach followed by the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits Courts, much less that advocated by Mann. 
The Seventh Circuit considered the issue in United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 
514 (7th Cir. 2003).  After reviewing the various approaches taken by other circuit 
courts, the Seventh Circuit decided, under the circumstances of that case, it did not 
have to decide what standard it would apply.  Id. at 516.  The reason the court did not 
have to resolve the presumption was because, to have standing, society must be willing 
to recognize the defendant’s subjective privacy expectation as legitimate and 
reasonable.  Id.  But “Haywood was not simply an unauthorized driver, he was also an 
unlicensed one.  Haywood should not have been driving any car, much less a rental car 
that Enterprise never would have given him permission to drive.  As a result, Haywood’s 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable.”  Id. 
                                            
1  Though Cutler is not binding on the Idaho Supreme Court, it was on the district court.  
Principles of stare decisis may also apply because, absent an opinion from the Idaho 
Supreme Court, Cutler has been controlling precedent for almost a decade. 
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Similarly in this case, Mann was not simply an unauthorized driver, he was also 
an unlicensed one; and he knew it.  (Tr., p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.3; p.30, Ls.5-6.)  Mann 
recognized that he, with a suspended license, could not personally rent the car from the 
rental company.  (Tr., p.13, L.22 – p.16, L.12.)  Mann should not have been driving any 
car, much less a rental car that the rental company never would have given him 
permission to drive.  Regardless of whether Mann had a subjective expectation of 
privacy, under those circumstances, as determined by the Seventh Circuit, his 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable. 
More recently, in United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2011), the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the standing issue:   
[R]ecognizing that the inquiry must remain “fact-bound,” [the Third Circuit] 
concur[red] with the majority of circuits that have considered this factual 
scenario and concluded that, as a general rule, the driver of a rental car 
who has been lent the car by the renter, but who is not listed on the rental 
agreement as an authorized driver, lacks a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary circumstances 
suggesting an expectation of privacy. 
 
Id. at 165 (citations omitted).  But those extraordinary circumstances should at least be 
analogous to those in Smith where the defendant was the de facto renter of the vehicle.  
Id. at 168.  This is because “an individual who borrows a rental car without the 
permission or knowledge of the owner not only acts in contravention of the owner’s 
property rights, but also deceives the owner of the vehicle while increasing the risk that 
the property will be harmed or lost.”  Id. at 165. 
The Supreme Court has noted “that arcane distinctions developed in property 
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control” the 
standing issue.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).  However, concepts of 
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ownership under property law are still relevant to the inquiry.  See id. at 143 n.12 (where 
the defendant’s presence “is wrongful[,] his expectation is not one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable” (internal quotes omitted).)  “[A]n unauthorized 
driver has no cognizable property interest in the rental vehicle and therefore no 
accompanying right to exclude.”  Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165.  Without that right, it is not 
reasonable “for an unauthorized driver to expect privacy in the vehicle.”  Id. (citing 
J. Blackmun’s concurrence in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), stating that 
“[n]ot every concept of ownership or possession is ‘arcane’” and “‘the right to exclude’ is 
an essential element of modern property rights” that “often may be a principal 
determinant in the establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amendment interest”). 
Likewise in this case, Mann’s use of the rental vehicle was not only in breach of 
the rental contract but in contravention of the rights of the property owner, the rental 
company.  And Mann’s use of the rental car was in fact wrongful:  He was not only 
unauthorized to drive the rental car, he was unauthorized to drive any car.  Absent 
extraordinary circumstances, which are not present in this case, society would not be 
willing to recognize Mann’s subjective privacy interest as reasonable or legitimate.  
Applying the reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit in Kennedy, Mann lacked standing 
to challenge a search of the rental car. 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Cutler, based on the Sixth Circuit’s Smith 
opinion, strikes the proper balance between recognizing the general presumption, that 
unauthorized drivers do not have standing to challenge the search of the rental car, and 
also allowing for extraordinary circumstances to overcome that presumption.  Applying 
that standard, Mann has failed to show sufficient circumstances to overcome the 
 
10 
presumption.  Mann has therefore failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion 
that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the rental car, where he was not an 
authorized driver of that car.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
II. 
Mann Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Instructions To The Jury 
 
A. Introduction 
At the close of the state’s case below, Mann moved for a judgment of acquittal 
asserting, inter alia, that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove 
possession of paraphernalia because it did not show that Mann intended to use the 
paraphernalia in Idaho to ingest marijuana.  (Tr., p.208, L.22 – p.209, L.10; p.211, Ls.2-
17.)  The district court denied the motion noting, inter alia, that the model jury instruction 
did not require that the defendant intend to use the paraphernalia in Idaho; only that he 
possessed it in Idaho.  (Tr., p.212, Ls.12-21.)  The district court asked if there were any 
additional objections by the defense, and counsel objected, inter alia, to the elements 
instruction on possession of paraphernalia.  (Tr., p.213, Ls.1-2, 11-17.)  Rejecting 
counsel’s theory, the district court gave its elements instruction, patterned on the model 
instructions.  (Tr., p.219, L.24 – p.220, L.9.) 
During closing arguments the following day, defense counsel, ignoring the district 
court’s rulings, proceeded to argue that the state was required to prove that Mann had 
possessed the paraphernalia with the intent to use it in the state of Idaho.  (Tr., p.248, 
L.12 – p.249, L.11.)  The district court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to defense 
counsel’s improper argument.  (Tr., p.249, Ls.12-25.)  Later during deliberations, the 
jury sought clarification from the district court regarding, inter alia, whether “intending to 
 
11 
use” required the state to show that the defendant intended to “use in Idaho?  Or 
elsewhere.”  (Aug. R., p.1; see also Tr., p.264, Ls.9-10.)  Over Mann’s objection, the 
district court responded with a supplemental instruction, explaining to the jury: 
You are instructed that any possession of paraphernalia must occur in 
Idaho.  If you find the defendant possessed paraphernalia in Idaho, you 
must consider whether the defendant intended to use the paraphernalia.  
It does not matter in which state the defendant formed the intent to use the 
paraphernalia. 
 
(Tr., p.264, Ls.13-18; see also R., p.202 (Instruction No. 21).) 
On appeal, Mann claims that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
that merely possessing the paraphernalia in Idaho was insufficient; Mann had to 
possess the paraphernalia with the intent to use it while in Idaho.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.16-21.)  This argument fails because, as shown below, that would be an incorrect 
statement of the law.  Mann was therefore not entitled to such an instruction, and he 
has failed to show error by the district court. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)).  “An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 




C. The District Court Properly Instructed The Jury 
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of 
the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the 
evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions.  State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 
873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987).   
At the heart of Mann’s argument is his claim that, in order to be guilty of 
possession of paraphernalia, he had to intend to use the paraphernalia while in Idaho.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-21.)  Mann explains his argument, stating: 
[W]hat matters is whether the defendant had the intent to use the alleged 
paraphernalia to introduce a controlled substance into the human body in 
the jurisdiction in which he possessed the paraphernalia.  In other words, 
the essential elements of the offense are satisfied by the act of possession 
joined with present intent to use in Idaho. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.20.)2  Mann’s argument fails because, contrary to his assertions, 
there is no such requirement under the statute. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. 
State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010).  Because “the best guide to 
legislative intent” is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin 
with the literal words of the statute.  State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009).  Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it 
but simply follows the law as written.  McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 
142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). 
                                            
2  To support his argument, Mann also relies, in part, on the requirement articulated in 
State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 872, 26 P.3d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 2001), that the state 
must show “that an essential element of the offense occurred within Idaho” to show 
subject matter jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s brief, p.20.)  This requirement was of course 
fulfilled when the state showed that Mann possessed the paraphernalia in Idaho. 
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Idaho Code § 37-2734A, which criminalizes the possession of paraphernalia, is 
unambiguous and provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce into the human body a controlled substance. 
 
Under the statute’s plain language, there is no requirement that a defendant possessing 
drug paraphernalia intend to use that paraphernalia to introduce a controlled substance 
into his body while in Idaho.  Possession with the intent to use the paraphernalia to 
“introduce into the human body a controlled substance” is sufficient. 
This is further demonstrated by the pattern jury instructions for possession of 
paraphernalia, which require the state to prove the following elements of the crime: 
1. On or about [date] 
 
2. in the State of Idaho, 
 
3. the defendant [name] [used] [or] [possessed] [(description of 
alleged paraphernalia, e.g., a spoon)], intending 
 
4. [insert description of use of paraphernalia, e.g., to plant or 
cultivate] a controlled substance. 
 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
I.C.J.I. 408.  The pattern jury instructions, like the statute itself, do not require the state 
to prove that the defendant intended to use the paraphernalia in Idaho; only that the 
defendant possessed paraphernalia in Idaho, which he intended to use.  And the 
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pattern jury instructions are presumptively correct.  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted).  Mann has failed to rebut that 
presumption. 
The district court’s elements instruction followed both the language of the statute 
and the relevant pattern instruction, I.C.J.I. 408, and so was presumptively correct.  The 
district court’s clarifying instruction to the jury, necessitated by defense counsel’s 
attempts to confuse the jury, was likewise correct.  Because the district court would 
have misstated the law by altering the instruction to conform with Mann’s idiosyncratic 
view of Idaho Code § 37-2734A, Mann was not entitled to such an instruction.  The 
district court’s instructions were correct, and the court should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Mann’s convictions for 
trafficking in marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and driving without privileges. 
 DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Russell J. Spencer____________________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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